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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article first examines the different ways in which the Mac-
Crate Report' demonstrates the pervasiveness of legal ethics in the
practice of law. Second, this Article describes a set of basic principles
that strongly suggest that the study of legal ethics ought to be inte-
grated with the study of fundamental lawyering skills. Finally, this
Article gives a brief account of two exercises from Northwestern Uni-
versity School of Law's integrated program to demonstrate the impor-
tance of a contextual introduction to legal ethics.
II. THE MACCRATE REPORT AND THE PERVASIVENESS OF
LEGAL ETHICS IN COMPETENT PRACTICE
An examination of the MacCrate Report's "Statement of Funda-
mental Lawyering Skills and Professional Values" reveals the differ-
Copyright held by the NEBRAsKA LAW REvIEw.
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.
1. SECTION ON LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, AMRIcAN BA Ass'N,
LEGAL EDUC. AND PROFESSIONAL DEvLopMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTNuUm
(Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the
Gap, 1992) [hereinafter MAcCRATE REPORT or REPORT].
LEGAL ETHICS
ent ways in which ethics pervade the competent practice of law. Upon
close inspection, the statement shows that the Report's division of
what is fundamental to the practice of law into skills, on the one hand,
and values, on the other, can only be deemed tentative and provi-
sional. Ironically, it is the skills section, and not the values section,
that demonstrates the importance of legal ethics in the practice of law,
something that is true for at least three reasons.
First, the exercise of many of the skills identified by the MacCrate
Report are, in fact, controlled by the ethical rules, although the Report
itself does not explicitly advert to them. Generally, the notion that a
new lawyer should have a basic level of competence in a number of
essential skills merely expresses the ethical duty of competence. 2 The
"skills and concepts involved in developing a plan of action with the
client... including... [elvaluating the comparative efficacy and desir-
ability of the alternative possible plans of action, comparing and rank-
ing them on the basis of... [tihe extent to which each plan of action is
likely to achieve the client's objectives and satisfy his or her priorities
and preferences .... [and] [tihe extent to which each plan of action is
consistent with the financial resources which the client is able and
willing to devote"3 parallels the Model Rules' provision regarding the
client's control over the objectives of the representation 4 and the Com-
ment's explicit suggestion that the client should make the decision re-
garding the amount of resources to be devoted to representation. 5
Furthermore, the "skills and concepts involved in implementing a
plan of action, including... [aissessing whether the matter should be
referred (in whole or in part) to another lawyer,"6 recalls the Comment
to the Model Rules' competency requirement. 7
Moreover, the various skills of counseling the client about the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of a given course of action involve the
Model Rules' duty of communications and the demanding notion of
consultation that is required in various contexts under the Rules.9
The skill of "[aissessing whether some aspects of the plan may appro-
priately be delegated to law clerks, paralegals, investigators, or sup-
2. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.1. (1995)[hereinafter MODEL
RULES]
3. MAcCRATr REPORT, supra note 1, at 144-45.
4. MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.2.
5. MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.2 cmt.
6. MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 145.
7. MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.1 cmt. 1.
8. MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.4.
9. "'Consult' or 'Consultation' denotes communication of information reasonably suf-
ficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in ques-
tion." MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Preamble, tit. Terminology § 2. See, e.g.,
MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.7 (requirement of consultation before waiver
of conflicts).
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port staff'lo recalls the Model Rules' provision that a lawyer with
"direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reason-
able efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with the
professional obligations of the lawyer."l (This provision then defines
those circumstances in which the lawyer is answerable in a discipli-
nary proceeding for actions of the assistant.)12
Another example in which a MacCrate Report skill mirrors an ethi-
cal obligation is the Report's skill concerning timeliness,' 3 which par-
allels the Model Rules' requirement of diligence: "[a] lawyer shall act
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client."14
The skills of legal research and argument15 are limited by the ethical
duty to "disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling juris-
diction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of
the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel."'16 Conversely, the
skills of legal analysis are also necessary to judge whether or not au-
thority is directly adverse to the client's position. Further, the skill of
document analysis17 is necessary to fulfill the ethical requirement "to
make reasonably diligent efforts to comply with a legally proper dis-
covery request by an opposing party."' 8
Negotiation19 is controlled by the ethical requirement of truthful-
ness in statements to others.2o The Comment only hints at the diffi-
culties embedded in this ethical requirement.
Whether a particular statement should be regarded as one of fact can depend
on the circumstances. Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation,
certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material
fact. Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a
party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are in this cate-
10. MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 146.
11. MODEL RuLEs, supra note 2, Rule 5.3(b).
12. Id., Rule 5.3(c).
13. MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 147.
14. MODEL RuLEs, supra note 2, Rule 1.3.
15. MAcCRAT REPORT, supra note 1, at 157-63.
16. MODEL RULEs, supra note 2, Rule 3.3(a)(3).
17. MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 168-69.
18. MODEL RULEs, supra note 2, Rule 3.4(d).
19. MAcCiRTE REPORT, supra note 1, at 185-90.
20. MODEL RuLEs, supra note 2, Rule 4.1 provides:
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person;
or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure
is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a cli-
ent, unless disclosure is prohibited by rule 1.6.
For a discussion of the extreme tension between Rule 4.1(b) and Rule 1.6 and a
problematic attempt at a resolution, see GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., & W. WmLIAM
HODEs, THE LAw OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RuLEs OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT, VOL. II 721-23 (1989).
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gory, and so is the existence of an undisclosed principal except where nondis-
closure of the principal would constitute fraud.2 1
To complicate matters further, lawyers have been severely disciplined
for failures to disclose during negotiation certain aspects of their cli-
ents' situations. 2 2 In addition, the laws affecting lawyering beyond
the disciplinary rules, in particular the law of fraud, have important
effects on lawyer statements in negotiation.23
Of course, the effective acquisition of information for purposes of
preparing a case for trial requires interviewing witnesses,24 some of
whom are or may become opposing parties or are the present or past
employees of opposing parties. Some of those witnesses are not repre-
sented by counsel and may misunderstand the lawyer's role.2 5 Others
have retained counsel to represent them "in the matter," thereby pre-
cluding direct communication.26 Moreover, the rules that control con-
tacts with present and past employees of represented corporations are
by no means intuitively obvious.2 7 These rules have some important
variations by jurisdiction and can have a potentially devastating effect
on the representation. Finally, ethical rules 28 control the "setting [of]
fees and [the] obtaining [of] retainers from cients"29 and other aspects
of the business side of law practice, such as advertising and
soliciting.3O
A second reason why the skills section of the Report demonstrates
the centrality of ethics to the practice of law is that some important
skills require the consideration of ethical limitations on tactically at-
tractive courses of action. Thus, the most basic skill, identifying and
diagnosing the problem, requires an "accurate and complete under-
standing of the client's situation and objectives, including... [t]he
optimal timetable for resolving the problem, taking into account...
21. MODEL RULEs, supra note 2, Rule 4.1 cmt. 2.
22. State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Addison, 226 Neb. 585, 412 N.W.2d 855
(1987)(lawyer's failure to correct hospital administrator's misunderstanding of
the extent of client's insurance coverage disciplinable offense).
23. State Nat'l Bank of El Paso v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App.
1984)(fraud judgment against lawyer for making a threat that was not fully au-
thorized by client).
24. MAcCRAT REPORT, supra note 1, at 191.
25. MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 4.3 provides:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented
by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinter-
ested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the un-
represented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the
lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.
26. MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 4.2.
27. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-356
(1991)(contacting former employees of represented corporate opponent).
28. MODEL RuLEs, supra note 2, Rule 1.5.
29. MAcCRTE REPORT, supra note 1, at 202.
30. MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rules 7.1-7.5.
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[t]he ethical limitations upon the use of delay tactics when delay is in
the client's interest."3 1 In addition, "leiffective counseling requires...
[an] understanding of the various ethical rules and professional values
that shape the nature and bounds of a counseling relationship be-
tween lawyer and client, including ... [tlhe division of authority be-
tween lawyer and client in making decisions that affect the resolution
of a client's legal problem... "32 Further, skillful counseling requires
an understanding of the "extent to which it is proper for a lawyer...
to attempt to persuade the client to take certain courses of action that
the client is not inclined to take ... because the lawyer believes these
measures are necessary to safeguard the client's welfare or best
interests."33
Moreover, counseling a client requires an appreciation of the "ex-
tent to which it is proper for a lawyer ... [to] [alttempt[ ] to persuade
the client to modify his or her decisions or actions to accommodate the
interests of justice, fairness, or morality. .. ."34 Unfortunately, effec-
tive counseling, broadly understood, also includes the contingency
that the client may refuse to "modify his or her decisions or actions to
accommodate the interests of justice, fairness, or morality," in which
case the lawyer must consider whether to take "action to safeguard
the interests of third parties or the general public" or whether to
"w]ithdraw[] from the representation of the client."35 If withdrawal
is the chosen course of action, such action will accordingly implicate
the difficult ethical rules surrounding withdrawal from representa-
tion,3 6 revelation of confidential information, 37 and action in the face
of client misconduct.38
31. MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 142-43. See MODEL RULEs, supra note 2,
Rule 3.2, which provides that "[a] lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expe-
dite litigation consistent with the interests of the client." The Comment to Rule
3-2 adds:
Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute. De-
lay should not be indulged merely for the convenience of the advocates,
or for the purpose of frustrating an opposing party's attempt to obtain
rightful redress or repose. It is not a justification that similar conduct is
often tolerated by the bench and bar. The question is whether a compe-
tent lawyer acting in good faith would regard the course of action as hav-
ing some substantial purpose other than delay. Realizing financial or
other benefit from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a legiti-
mate interest of the client.
MODEL RULEs, supra note 2, Rule 3.2 cmt.
32. MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 176-77 (citation omitted).
33. Id. at 177. This latter is, of course, the problem of paternalism.
34. Id. (citation omitted).
35. Id. (citation omitted).
36. MODEL RULEs, supra note 2, Rule 1.16.
37. Id. Rule 1.6(b).
38. Id. Rule 4.1(b).
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Third, finally and most broadly, many of the lawyering "skills"
which the Report identifies have traditionally been considered "vir-
tues."3 9 For example, sensitivity to the limitations of one's experience
or competence and to the limitations of one's knowledge of the facts of
a particular case requires the virtue of humility. "Obtaining an accu-
rate and complete understanding of the client's situation and objec-
tives, including ... [t]he precise circumstances and needs that make
the situation a problem for the cient"40 requires more than "inter-
viewing skills" that are conceived of as purely technical proficiencies.
Real "active listening" requires the virtue of empathy.
A respect for the client's autonomy embodied in the "skill" of con-
tinually consulting with the client about developments in the case and
the expenditure of the client's funds is closely akin to the virtue of
selflessness. Suggesting to the client that his account of the facts may
be incomplete requires courtesy and tact. Generating a broad range of
solutions, including those that may require a lower-level employment
of the lawyer's services, requires integrity and imagination. Trying
cases requires patience, diligence, and often courage. Further, to de-
termine fairly 'the probabilities of successful implementation" of a
plan of action requires a realistic and moral clarity of vision, the oppo-
site of sentimentality and wishful thinking.41
The distinctively rhetorical or "political" skill of communication 42
comes into play when a lawyer addresses an audience with quite di-
vergent interests from those of the client. Here it is crucial to view
situations from the point of view of the various audiences, something
that requires a kind of imaginative self-transcendence that Kant
called the "enlargement of mind."43 In addition, it has been suggested
that persuasive story-telling, most fully employed in opening state-
ments at trial,44 but invoked informally in dozens of different con-
texts, requires a moral quality.45 Some "skills" really are virtues.
Making an oblique reference to these broader ethical considera-
tions, the MacCrate Report provides that a lawyer ought to be familiar
39. I am speaking here of moral virtues. It goes without saying that many lawyering
tasks require what the western philosophical tradition labeled intellectual vir-
tues. See, e.g., BRANw DAVIES, Tan THOUGHT OF THOmAS AQUrNAs 240-42 (1992).
Virtue ethics has undergone an important resurgence since the publication of
ALAsDAIR MAONrnmn, AFrER Vmrtu (1981).
40. MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 142-43.
41. Iu MuRDocH, THE Sov mGNTr OF GOOD (1970). See also Robert P. Burns,
Lawyer's Truth: Notes for a Moral Philosophy ofLitigation Practice, 3 J.L. & RELI-
GION 229 (1985).
42. MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 173.
43. HAmNAH AmNDT, IEcTuas oN KANV's POLIcAL PmosopHY 42-43 (1982). Ef-
fective negotiation, the Report properly notes, requires an analogous skill, Skill7.1(f)(i)(B).
44. AcCRATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 194.
45. RoNArD BInxER, POLrIcAL JUDGmiENT 126-28 (1983).
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with the "[n]ature and [slources of [e]thical [sltandards, including...
[tlhe basic concept of law as an ethical profession, which ... [ilmposes
upon each member of the profession certain ethical obligations to cli-
ents, the legal system, the profession, and the general public; and...
[dlefines those obligations in terms which involve their interpretation
both by individual attorneys at the level of conscience and by author-
ized organs of the profession ... ."46 The Report urges familiarity as
well with "[aispects of ethical philosophy bearing upon the propriety of
particular practices or conduct (such as, for example, general ethical
precepts calling for honesty, integrity, courtesy and respect for others
[and] [a] lawyer's personal sense of morality).... ."47
These sorts of virtues or dispositions are even more closely inter-
twined with the actual practices described by the skills than is the
broad obligation described under "Values" of "acting in conformance
with considerations of justice, fairness, and morality when making de-
cisions or acting on behalf of a client" and, "[tlo the extent required or
permitted by the ethical rules of the profession, counseling clients to
take considerations of justice, fairness, and morality into account
when the client makes decisions or engages in conduct that may have
an adverse effect on other individuals or on society."48 On the other
hand, no one who fails to shape his daily practice (the skills) by the
dispositions generally called moral is going to be capable of recogniz-
ing and discerning what the "considerations of justice, fairness, and
morality" are.
Moral knowledge is not technical knowledge.49 It is available only
to those who have allowed themselves to be shaped by the demands of
morality in their own practices. Moral virtues not only pervade the
skills, but are also the basis of a lawyer's commitment to the values
recommended by the Task Force. Both "skills" and "values" require
"those qualities of truth-speaking, of a high sense of honor, of granite
discretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility that
have, throughout the centuries, been compendiously described as
'moral character."o Effectively exercising the skills identified by the
MacCrate Report requires exercise of the virtues.
46. MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 203 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 204.
48. Id. at 213.
49. HANs-GEoRG GAAmR, TRUnT AND METHOD (W. Glen-Doepel trans., 1975).
50. MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 213-14 (commentary to Value 2, quoting




Can virtue be taught? That is one of the oldest questions.5 1 I
broadly follow David Luban52 (himself following Aristotle) in sug-
gesting that virtues can be taught through a program that compels
students to act in contexts that require the ethical exercise of lawyer-
ing skills and to receive critiques by experienced practitioners who are
masters of the virtuous exercise of those skills and are willing to
demonstrate and recommend that exercise (Socrates would say "ex-
hort" it)53 to their students.
My sole purpose in this long introduction was to demonstrate that
the ethical obligations of a lawyer and the fundamental skills of law
practice are deeply intertwined in many different ways. From the
skills side, it is hard to argue that a lawyer may competently practice
unless he does so in light of his ethical obligations. Some obligations
actually constitute the skills themselves. To the extent that the skills
are purely technical (something that is quite rare given the interper-
sonal context of virtually all lawyering tasks), other obligations con-
trol or limit the exercise of those skills. From the narrowest
perspective, unethical practice continually places the lawyer's reputa-
tion, livelihood, and sometimes freedom54 in jeopardy. But more
broadly, unethical practice is usually ineffectual practice. It is the na-
ture of a decent culture and society to create the background practices
and institutions which, as far as humanly possible, make unethical
behavior self-defeating without resorting to disciplinary mechanisms.
One cannot be skilled unless one is also ethical, at least in some sense.
Usually then, practice cannot be effective unless it is in some sense
ethical. It is just as fruitful, however, to examine the relationship be-
tween teaching lawyering skills and teaching ethics from the point of
view of teaching ethics. I argue that an effective way of teaching legal
ethics is through a program that closely integrates the learning of eth-
ics with the learning of the basic lawyering skills that are identified in
the MacCrate Report. Furthermore, I argue that such an integration
is the best way of learning certain fundamental aspects of legal ethics.
I argue, as I have elsewhere,55 from philosophical and educational
principles and from our experience of teaching such a program at
51. PLATO, MTENo (W.KC. Guthrie trans., 1956) in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF
PLATO (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1961).
52. David Luban, Epistemology and Moral Education, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 636 (1983).
See also infra text accompanying note 63.
53. 2 WERNER JAEGER, PAIDEIA: THE IDEALS OF GREEK CULTURE 37 (Gilbert Highet
trans., 1948).
54. It surprises our students to understand that lawyers are fully capable of criminal
accountability for the crimes of their clients if they provide advice with the intent
to further the criminal enterprise. This is a lesson no law student should gradu-
ate without learning.
55. Robert P. Burns, Teaching the Basic Ethics Course Through Simulation, 58 LAw
& CONTEMP. INOBs. 37 (1995).
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Northwestern, an experience that has proven successful. The integra-
tion of teaching lawyering skills with professional responsibility
makes such patent good sense that in twenty years law teachers will
wonder how the subjects could ever have been taught in isolation from
one another.
III. TEACHING ETHICS AND LAWYERING
Simply by describing the basic proficiencies that a young lawyer
ought to learn, the MacCrate Report demonstrates the ethical dimen-
sion of good lawyering. Many of us had realized this already and have
taken steps to teach lawyering in a way that is respectful of its ethical
dimensions. From one point of view, this is simply another example of
the need to understand rules contextually and is part of a broad move-
ment in legal education to understand doctrine and theory in light of
the practices from which they may be abstracted.
I have identified "eight theses on the learning of legal ethics" that
underlie our "program in advocacy and professionalism" at Northwest-
ern. In our program, the required ethics course is taught through sim-
ulation and as part of a coordinated introduction to the litigation
program. We think this is ideal, but we have designed a set of materi-
als that can be taught in a free-standing ethics class which is not for-
mally coordinated with other courses. In our program, students are
required to perform basic lawyering tasks, such as interviewing and
counseling clients, negotiating controversies, and performing trial ex-
ercises, all of which raise important ethical issues. The intimacy of
the relationship between ethics and competent performance is ex-
pressed by the very fact that the rudiments of the skills of interview-
ing and negotiating, for example, are being taught at the same time as
the ethical considerations that structure and limit the use of those
skills. An important dimension of our program, described at greater
length below, is the active participation of practicing lawyers in the
simulations.
Underlying our program are certain fundamental principles. First,
many of the most serious ethical problems emerge for lawyers because
they do not see the ethical significance of concrete situations in which
they find themselves. When I was teaching trial advocacy to young
lawyers in continuing legal education programs, I was often struck by
the inability of our student-lawyers to see and navigate through evi-
dentiary problems as they arose in the simulated trial exercises we
were doing. Many of these lawyers were not far from their law school
evidence courses and had, no doubt, done quite well in them. But they
had learned their evidence law in abstraction from the practice, the
trial, of which the law of evidence provides the grammar. They could,
perhaps, perform some of the informal logical exercises that are de-
manded by an appellate treatment of the law of evidence. However,
[Vol. 75:684
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they could not recognize and solve evidentiary issues where they were
the most important, at the trial level.
Based on this experience, I concluded that they did not really un-
derstand the law of evidence and that it was, in part, the fault of law
schools. This is not an overstatement because of another underlying
principle. Meaning is use. Knowing how and knowing what are inti-
mately related.56 A lawyer really understands a rule if he can per-
form the task that the rule controls.
Our solution to the decontextualized learning of the law of evi-
dence was to create a set of materials that allowed the integrated
teaching of the practice, trial advocacy, and the rules which controlled
it, the law of evidence.57 It became one of the most highly rated
courses in the school. Our evidence teacher received the school's Rob-
ert Childress Memorial Award for Excellence in Teaching. The pro-
gram received the Emil Gumpert Award for Excellence from the
American College of Trial Lawyers and our students won the National
Trial Competition. Because of the success of the program, we con-
cluded that at least some of a lawyer's inability to see serious issues of
legal ethics could be cured by learning those ethical principles as they
emerged in context. As all skills teachers know, the amount and sub-
tlety of knowledge and the range of considerations that can be woven
into a good simulated problem far exceed highly abstract narratives
that form appellate court statements of facts.
Another principle is that students master those skills and doc-
trines that are necessary for competent performances. Students fac-
ing a well-constructed simulated problem have the important benefit
of active learning, which provides for a more confident grasp of exactly
what a given rule requires. We believe that learning legal ethics
through simulated exercises, which requires students to perform im-
portant lawyering tasks, improves a student's ability to see ethical
problems as they emerge and permits a richer understanding of a law-
yer's ethical obligations. It enriches the legal context for the learning
of the basic lawyering skills in the same way that studying evidence
together with trial advocacy enriches both the contextual grasp of the
evidentiary rules and the deftness of the student-lawyer's trial per-
formance on the evidentiary terrain.
In some ways, the considerations that counsel studying evidence in
the context of a simulated course on trial advocacy apply with even
greater force to the learning of legal ethics. Both in and out of the
56. HANNA FEICHEL PrTIUN, WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE: ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN FOR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT 47-49 (1972).
57. ROBERT P. BURNS, STEVEN LuBET & Jm~ms SECKINGER, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS
IN EVIDENCE AND TRIAL ADVOCACY: CASES (1994); ROBERT P. BURNS & STEVEN




specific context of professional responsibility, ethical behavior re-
quires self-imposed limitations on the exercise of purposeful behavior.
In the broadest sense, ethics requires that a person not make himself
"an exception"5S-that he pursue his goals subject to the limitations
that express an equal respect for others to pursue their own goals.
Competitive situations place the greatest psychological strain on such
self-imposed constraints: anyone who has practiced understands how
great the temptation is to gain some tactical advantage in negotiation
or litigation by ignoring ethical considerations. It is hard to give up
small advantages on what is often a hard-fought battlefield just be-
cause ethical principles say you should. This is doubly difficult when a
lawyer has no absolute guarantee that his opponent is respecting the
same norms.
59
These pressures should not be allowed to come as a surprise to a
young lawyer. It is important that these difficulties be experienced
and resolved in the relatively more reflective atmosphere of law
school. This suggests another reason for teaching ethics in the context
of a simulation-based lawyering program. Ethical norms are more
likely to hold when they are "dyed in the wool," that is, when they
have been integrated into a young lawyer's understanding of and ha-
bituation into the very practices those norms are meant to control. A
young lawyer must learn how to practice ethically and not just learn
that he should observe ethical norms.
This is another place where the participation of respected practi-
tioners (including clinicians and skills teachers with substantial prac-
tice background) can make an important contribution to the law
school program. They can show in the full-scale demonstrations and
in the mini-demonstrations that form part of the critique of student
performances precisely what ethical practice looks like and why it is
fully compatible with the demands of competence. Their participation
ensures that the ethics course does not appear as an exercise that
"merely punctuates an otherwise ruthlessly professional course with
occasional encouragements to moral uneasiness, like a weekly address
at military camp by a pacifist minister."60
Moreover, their participation ensures that the course maintains an
informed dialogue between what good lawyers actually do when faced
58. HANNA ARENDT, THImNING 188 (1st ed., 1978) (interpreting Kant's categorical
imperative).
59. Game theory views this sort of quandary as the "prisoner's dilemma." R.D. LucE
& HowARD RAIFFA, GAmEs AND DECISIONS 94-102 (1957). Though both lawyers
may generally be better off if both observe certain norms, the tactical disadvan-
tage of one lawyer "free-riding" the other lawyer's observance of constraints
threatens a race to the ethical bottom. On the pressures on the moral psychology
of litigation practice, see generally Burns, supra note 55.
60. Bernard Williams, Professional Morality and Its Dispositions in THE GOOD LAw-
YER: LAWYEs' ROLES AND LAwvEs' ETmcs 266 (David Luban ed., 1983).
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with recurring situations and what the criticism might be of that ha-
bitual response. Practicing lawyers, including clinicians and exper-
ienced skills teachers, will prevent purely academic lawyers from
setting up straw people in the service of overgeneralized theorizing.61
As I have stated elsewhere while addressing an audience of teachers
of professional responsibility:
Academics, whether moral philosophers or doctrinalists may, in their stance
toward the practicing bar, be tempted to adopt the stance of an '[ilntellectual
peace corps' to a 'morally undeveloped country'-as a distinguished philoso-
pher once put it in a closely related context .... Practitioners may be so
immersed in institutionally embedded values that they are tempted not to en-
vision alternatives. There is no once-and-for-all resolution for the question of
which perspective has comparative strength. Criticism that does not appreci-
ate the complexity of values and interests embedded in current practice can be
abstract and unhelpful. Practices can become distorted by their institutional
embodiments. A sustained dialogue among positions is what we owe our stu-
dents and that is what our program attempts.6 2
Even this probably understates the importance of the participation of
practitioners, who are often the most reflective critics of the status
quo.
Academics (in particular) are sometimes tempted to feel superior to such pro-
fessional laborers. They should not do so. Those laborers serve our needs,
which are often the deepest we have-the need for a social order, among
others. If those needs are essentially served by some activity or institution,
such as a profession, then there is nowhere to go to be superior to that institu-
tion, except by climbing out of oneself. The only decent direction in which to
move is into thought about how things might be otherwise, thoughts in which
one is quite likely to be joined, indeed led, by members of the profession
itself.6 3
Teaching ethics in the context of a simulation-based lawyering
skills program can provide students with a sense of the dense com-
plexity of legal ethics and the subtle ways in which hard-law rules
control some aspects of practice, while in others, the good judgment of
the experienced practitioner rules. It provides a young lawyer with a
more confident sense of what is mandatory and what is permissible
and how personal morality and the demands of a public professional
identity may function within the area of the permissible. Finally,
teaching ethics within the context of a lawyering skills program in
which admirable lawyers of substantial experience participate is
61. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Eth-
ics, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 1529.
62. Burns, supra note 55, at n.14. The reference to a "distinguished philosopher" is
to Alasdair MacIntyre, What Has Legal Ethics to Learn from Medical Ethics?, 2
PHnnosopmcAi. EXCHANGE 87 (1978). I use "abstrace in its Hegelian sense,
roughly equivalent to "overgeneral and insufficiently sensitive to the complexity
of considerations and values embedded in concrete practices and institutions."
GEORG WYUILE FMuEDCH, HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 75-104 (T.M. Knox
trans., 1952).
63. WILLmms, supra note 60, at 269.
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likely to encourage students to embrace ethical norms as an aspect of
professional identity in the vast areas of law practice which the disci-
plinary process will never touch.
IV. WHEN ONLY KNOWING HOW IS KNOWING THAT:
TWO EXAMPLES
This Article ends by briefly describing the integrated Introduction
to Litigation Program we have developed at Northwestern. Such an
introduction aims to provide a concrete example of what a program
would look like that took seriously the close relationship between eth-
ics and lawyering skills that emerges so clearly from the MacCrate
Report. It is, of course, not the only possible program. For example,
our program is oriented towards approximately half the class who ex-
press an expectation that litigation will be important to their prac-
tices.64 The Professional Responsibility course is closely integrated
with two other courses, Trial Advocacy and Evidence. It may not be
immediately possible, given institutional constraints and the "captain
of my own ship" attitude that prevails among many law teachers, for
other teachers to achieve this level of integration. Anticipating such
problems, though confident in an idea whose time has come, we have
created professional responsibility materials that can be and have
been used in a free-standing professional responsibility course that re-
spects the close relationship between lawyering skills and professional
responsibility and can be taught in either a large- or small-class
format.
Our program is designed to serve as the basic course in profes-
sional responsibility. It certainly does not preclude a student from
taking other courses in legal ethics. At Northwestern, for example,
students who have completed the basic course may take a seminar in
Criminal Defense Ethics and may choose from a series of professional
responsibility externships that involve the law student in a range of
practice settings, accompanied by classroom components which are fo-
cused on the ethical dimensions of practice in those settings.
We often take a critical perspective on the norms of the profession
in the course. The dramatic context of the exercises makes it more
difficult for students to view legal ethics in purely causative terms, as
one more opportunity to hone analytical skills. This critical perspec-
tive naturally raises deeper questions about the "ethics of legal eth-
ics." Students are required to maintain journals that give an account
of the simulations and are encouraged to engage in a "metalevel" cri-
tique of current professional norms from their own moral perspectives.
64. For an argument in favor of law schools teaching a number of ethics courses, each




Indeed, this kind of contextual grasp of legal ethics is a prerequisite to
informed critique from any number of perspectives.
This course is a basic course. Law schools can certainly offer ad-
vanced courses that explicitly take a more critical perspective on law
practice, using the growing literature in the humanities and social sci-
ences on law practice. In fact, a law student who has studied legal
ethics contextually is in a better position to understand that literature
and, turnabout being fair play, to assume a critical perspective on the
critique it offers.
As I mentioned above, David Luban has offered a powerful argu-
ment for the superiority of clinical methods for the learning of legal
ethics.6 5 He seems to have had in mind the live-case clinic rather
than the simulated program. Our experience has been that a simu-
lated program has certain advantages, while the live-case clinic has
others. Needless to say, the ideal program would provide both. (Many
of the students who take the simulated professional responsibility
course go on to take either the live-client, in-house clinic or one of the
professional responsibility practica which the school offers.) Simula-
tion is, of course, less resource-intensive than is the live-case method
and, for most schools, allows a larger number of students to partici-
pate. It also allows a more structured sequencing of issues, concepts,
and situations. The exercises can be constructed with the real world's
persistent indifference to easy subsumption under preexistent concep-
tual grids, even those provided by the law of professional responsibil-
ity. It is, as mentioned above, a good basic course to have even if the
particular student can benefit from further work in the live-client
clinic or in the more traditional advanced academic course.
The course we teach meets twice a week, each time for two hours.
Although the fourteen simulations form the heart of the course, we
supplement those exercises with other teaching methods. For exam-
ple, at the beginning of the course, we give two lectures. One provides
the students with a sense of the outer limits of the subject by provid-
ing a doctrinal overview of the law of professional responsibility. The
other is a more theoretical survey of the range of issues that consti-
tutes (or plagues) legal ethics as a subject for intellectual inquiry.
Much as in a good trial advocacy class, we also conduct demonstra-
tions on how to solve ethical issues "on the ground." This is an impor-
tant expression of our "Aristotelian" view that competent
performances will solve ethical problems that remain on a conceptual
or doctrinal level only dilemmas. Confounding students with concep-
tual dilemmas can yield a kind of cynicism about the very possibility
of better concrete resolutions of ethical problems, while plausible per-
formances can convince students that ethical issues can yield to intel-
65. Luban, supra note 52.
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ligence, decency, and competence. Finally, the simulations are
supplemented with problems in order to expand the range of situa-
tions that students should consider. The following sections will pro-
vide two examples of the major kinds of exercises that constitute the
course.
A. A Faculty Demonstration
Early in the course, faculty members with substantial practice ex-
perience demonstrate two client interviews.6 6 The case is a modified
version of an old favorite of the National Institute for Trial Advocacy,
Nita Liquor Commission v. Jones. An associate of the law firm does
the first interview of Dan Jones. In this first interview, Jones tells the
associate that he is in big trouble: he has two college-age children and
his only source of livelihood, the liquor store he owns and operates, is
threatened.
Several days ago, just before closing time, an investigator from the
Nita Liquor Commission walked into the store and handed him a cita-
tion for selling liquor to an intoxicated person. Jones tells his lawyer
that he knows of several instances where a liquor license has been
revoked for a single violation of this nature. Jones protests that he is
innocent, claiming that he did not sell alcohol to anyone who looked
intoxicated that night and, in particular, did not sell alcohol to the
person whom the investigator arrested for public intoxication, Walter
Watkins.
The associate proceeds to do a competent interview in order to
demonstrate the skill of interviewing a client who is an important oc-
currence witness. He inquires as to the client's understanding of his
problem, obtains a time-line narrative of the relevant events, tests out
the most obvious factual theory of the defense, that there was no sale,
and ends the interview by explaining to Jones what the next steps
are.6 7 From this interview, it emerges that as Jones was closing up
the store Officer Bier walked into the store and handed him a citation
for knowingly selling liquor to an intoxicated person. Jones was
shocked to receive the citation because he had no recollection of selling
liquor to anyone who seemed intoxicated. In issuing the citation, Of-
ficer Bier only stated that Jones had "sold Thunderbird to a drunk."
Jones tells the associate that he was busy going in and out of the
storeroom restocking the shelves and had begun mopping up the floor.
Several people entered the store during the period just before Officer
Bier's appearance, and Jones states that he probably made one or two
66. The account here closely follows our description in ROBERT P. BURNS, ET AL., Ex-
ERCISES AND PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrY: TEACHER's MANUAL 123-
27 (1994).
67. MAcCRATE RxPORT, supra note 1, at 142-43, 166-69 (Skills 1.1 and 4.3). See also
BINDER & PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (1977).
[Vol. 75:684
LEGAL ETHICS
sales, though he has no specific memory of doing so. The store does
stock Thunderbird wine, although Jones cannot remember selling it to
anyone.
However, Jones does remember two unusual facts. First, the tape
in the cash-register ran out earlier that day and so none of the custom-
ers that evening received written receipts. (The lawyer knows from
the arrest report that Watkins was arrested with a bottle of Thunder-
bird wine in a paper bag without a receipt.68 She understands that
the prosecution believes this to be a problem and is probably unaware
of the explanation.) Second, the night after Jones received the citation
a man in a postal worker's uniform came into the store. He recognized
the postal worker as having been in the store the night before, but has
not seen him since that night. The postal worker told Jones that
"some alcoholic" reached over the counter and stole a bottle of Thun-
derbird while Jones was in the stockroom. The postal worker said he
delayed mentioning it because he did not want to get involved.
The associate tries to reassure the anxious Jones that the case
"looks good." All they have to do is to subpoena the postal worker:
after all, if there were no sale, there can be no violation. The associate
tells Jones that he will get an investigator on the case.
In the second interview, the firm's trial partner conducts the inter-
view two days before the trial. Things have not gone as well as the
associate had hoped. They have been unable to locate the postal
worker. The interview can continue either of two ways, or better, in
both ways, one after the other. In the first approach, the trial partner
is a street-smart cynic who takes complete control of the interview.
He has made a strategic judgment about the best theory of the case,69
Jones sold the wine to Watkins without knowing that he was intoxi-
cated. He explains to Jones that Officer Bier's testimony will put Wat-
kins across the counter from Jones moving in a manner consistent
with a sale. The partner knows the judge, he tells Jones, and this
judge will always resolve credibility determinations against the de-
fendant. A "swearing contest" is a losing strategy. Jones continues to
protest his innocence.
The partner then explains to Jones that his "best bet" is to admit
the sale, but to describe it in a way that suggests he did not know
Watkins was intoxicated. The partner explains how the details of the
events and the cross-examination of Officer Bier can be coordinated to
present a plausible defense on the knowledge issue. The client asks
how he can describe something concretely that he cannot remember
doing. The partner asks a series of leading questions that moves the
client from "what must have been" to "what was" and forces the client
68. MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 168 (Skill 4.3(b)-document analysis).




to "remember" what must have been as what was. He reminds the
witness often of the importance of being "definite and concrete" in his
recollection and testimony.
The partner has made a "skilled" tactical judgment and has com-
pletely disregarded his obligation to not counsel or assist a witness to
testify falsely.70 He has not reconstructed events, but has consciously
constructed events to serve tactical purposes.
Conducting the second interview properly is much more difficult.
It demonstrates how ethical constraints are intrinsic to the practice of
litigation skills and how subtle (and how real) the difference is be-
tween ethical and unethical behavior. It may be, after all, that Jones
has made up the postal worker story because of a mistaken belief that
it would help his case or that the postal worker saw someone other
than Watkins steal the wine. (It turns out that the area is frequented
by alcoholic petty criminals.) It is true that "what probably happened"
or "what must have happened" is a fairly reliable guide to what did
happen. A witness's first recollection of events is often partial. Fol-
lowing the "rule of probability" is usually a reliable guide to recon-
structing events. An attorney owes it to a client to help him
reconstruct events, and an effective interviewer knows how to "moti-
vate" a witness to recall helpful material.71 There is some resem-
blance between what the ethical and competent attorney does and
what the unethical attorney does. There is a major difference as well.
God is in the details. There is a point at which reconstruction be-
comes construction, where an effective interviewing technique be-
comes the suborning of perjury. Demonstrations by decent and
competent lawyers, followed by thorough "debriefing," can begin the
process of developing professional judgment, as to where that point is
and highlighting the importance of clarity on its existence, in a way
that reading rules, doing hypotheticals, and analyzing appellate case
law never could.
B. A Student Exercise
This section provides a description of one of the simpler simulated
exercises which the students themselves perform. The student-law-
yers represent a young woman who once served as a maid in the home
of a wealthy individual. She has sued the individual for slander after
he accused her of stealing jewelry from his wife. One of the allegedly
slanderous statements was made to the executive director of a country
club where the defendant is a prominent member and where the plain-
tiff had applied for a job which she did not get. The executive direc-
tor's deposition has been taken and he described the defendant's
70. MODEL RULEs, supra note 2, Rule 3.4(b).
71. MAcCPATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 167.
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remarks to him in a manner that suggested the defendant was simply
reporting the facts in a straightforward and responsible manner, with-
out malice, and, therefore, most probably within the protection of the
qualified privilege that applied to such conversations. At the
deposition
the executive director explained that the defendant told him that he had al-
lowed the maid to work in his household even though he (the defendant) knew
that she had a criminal record for participation in an armed robbery. Since,
the executive director had explained, the club had a firm policy against the
hiring of ex-felons, nothing the defendant had said about the possible theft
could have actually caused the plaintiffs failure to be hired at the club.
Subsequently, the plaintiffs lawyers receive a call from the execu-
tive director, who wants to come into the office and have a private
conversation. The lawyers then have to answer a series of difficult
questions that dramatize the way in which competent lawyering skills
and ethical requirements are tightly intertwined. May they speak pri-
vately to someone who is not personally represented by counsel, but
who is an employee of a corporation on whose board the defendant
sits? Something strange is going on here: a witness closely aligned
with the opposing party who had given an unhelpful deposition now
wants to speak to counsel. How should you prepare for the meeting?
Who should be present? What are the dangers and what are the op-
portunities? What kind of warnings should be given or waivers
sought?
It turns out that the executive director has had a falling out with
the defendant and is now feeling quite hostile towards him. In fact, he
is interested in discussing representation in a possible unfair dis-
charge suit against the same man who is the defendant in the current
suit. He tells the plaintiffs lawyers that he told the truth "by and
large" at his deposition, but he has something to add about what the
defendant said. If students have prepared well for the exercise (as we
find they do), then they will recall that to the question "Other than
what you have said, did [the defendant] say anything more to you dur-
ing the conversation at the Club on July 23?" the executive director
answered, "No." It seems that the executive director is in the process
of admitting to peijury. He asks the lawyers, "Should I tell you what
more [the defendant] really told me at the Club?"
How should the lawyers answer the executive director's question?
They are prohibited from giving legal advice to an unrepresented per-
son where there is a reasonable possibility that the person's interest
may be in conflict with those of the lawyer's client.72 On the other
hand, there is no prohibition against interviewing an unrepresented
witness. Concretely, what should they say to the executive director's
72. MODEL RuLEs, supra note 2, Rule 4.3 cmt.
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question? After a stern disclaimer of disinterestedness, 73 urge the ex-
ecutive director to speak? Tell him, "It's up to you!"? Say, "Well, I
represented the plaintiff and anything you tell me will help me do my
job?" Stop the executive director at mid-sentence, perhaps recommend
that he get counsel, and schedule his deposition?
If the student-lawyers decide to take the statement, how should
they do so? What kind of disclaimers of undue influence should it con-
tain? Should they retain a court reporter to get a verbatim statement
with follow-up questions at the risk of scaring off the executive direc-
tor? Is it any more likely to be admissible as substantive evidence
under Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A) or 804(b)(1) or 804(b)(5)?
If so, is it worth the risk? What about the executive director's interest
in future representation in his unfair discharge case against the de-
fendant-is keeping that door open "reinforcing positive motiva-
tions"74 or is it offering "an inducement to a witness that is prohibited
by law?"75
This is one of the simpler simulations that requires an integrated
learning of skills and ethics. It is our conviction the solutions to the
problems that the exercise presents are performances, not concepts. It
is our goal that students learn "good practice," a practice that includes
both a strategic and an ethical element. We can think of no better way
of learning the ethical dimension of law practice than in a course of
performing well-designed exercises and with the participation of law-
yers who care about the ethical dimension of their work.
V. A POSTSCRIPT ON COURSES, COURSE NAMES, AND
COURSE CONTENT
I cannot resist a final word on course organization and structure.
As mentioned above, our materials are designed to be used in a free-
standing legal ethics or professional responsibility course. This is the
inherited structure for law school study of the subject. The thrust of
the first section of this Article, however, is that the MacCrate Report
itself shows this structure implicitly abstracts the norms from the
practices which they shape and limit. Most teachers will have to live
with the free-standing professional responsibility course. Fortu-
nately, much can be accomplished even in that context. However,
other possibilities do exist.
First, the ethics course can be coordinated with Trial Advocacy and
Evidence, as was done at Northwestern. Secondly, it can be coordi-
73. MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 4.3.
74. MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 167.
75. MODEL RuLEs, supra note 2, Rule 3.4(b).
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nated with a course in Lawyering Process or Pretrial Process. 76
Third, it can be a single semester or a year-long course, ideally for a
larger number of credits, and perhaps called 'Professional Responsi-
bility in Lawyering." Finally, simulations that emphasize professional
responsibility, such as the ones contained in Exercises and Problems
in Professional Responsibility,77 can be offered in an organized way,
parallel to or within a number of skills courses, such as Pretrial Prac-
tice, Negotiation and Dispute Resolution, and Trial Advocacy. The
various approaches have different advantages and disadvantages and
local factors loom large in these matters, which should be of only sec-
ondary importance.
VI. CONCLUSION
The MacCrate Report demonstrates the different ways in which
good law practice is deeply intertwined with the ethical norms that
make it what it is. Such ethical norms are "constitutive rules." Learn-
ing these rules in context is an important part of a good program in
lawyering skills.
76. We offer a simulated course in Pretrial Litigation which most students take after
the basic ethics course. The former offers more intensive work on the pretrial
practice skills which are introduced in the professional responsibility course.
77. BuRNs, supra note 66.
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